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Black and White and Brilliant: Protecting
Black-and-White Films from
Color-Recoding
by SuzANNE ILENE SCHILLER*
Introduction
The film industry has long been a leader in finding new ap-
plications for advances in technology. Since their advent, films
have changed dramatically. Silent black-and-white shorts have
given way to stereophonic Technicolor extravaganzas. In the
process, the art of filmmaking has adapted, and most film-
makers now visualize their creations with computer-created
special effects and high-tech sound.
However, when movies were made without sound or color
they were specifically designed to be viewed that way. The art-
ists who worked on those early films-the writers, set decora-
tors, cinematographers, and directors-geared their creative
energies toward producing films that were black-and-white
and, in most cases, silent.
As early as 1898, filmmakers experimented with adding color
to films.' In the early twentieth century, color was occasionally
hand-stenciled onto prints.2 Actual color film was developed
around 1918, and the first feature film to be photographed en-
tirely in color, Beccy Sharp,3 was released in 1935. 4
Today, computer technology is being used to add color to
black-and-white classics. This process, known as colorization
or color-recoding,5 has angered most film artists. It has gener-
ally been assumed that filmmakers who object to the color-
* BA., Bennington College, 1983; J.D., Hastings College of the Law, 1987.
1. . HALLIWELL, THE FILMGOER'S COMPAMON 159 (6th ed. 1978).
2. I&
3. RKO Pictures, Inc., 1935.
4. L. HALLiw Lupra note 1, at 159.
5. This note will use the term "color-recoding" instead of the more popular
"colorization" because one company in the business of coloring films has apparently
reserved the latter term. See Comments of DGA in Response to Notice of Inquiry at
1, Registration of Claims to Copyright Notice of Inquiry, Colorization of Motion Pie.
tures (US. Copyright Office 1986) (Docket No. 86-1) hereinafter DGA Comments;
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recoding of their works have no legal recourse, either because
the copyrights to these films are owned by those commissioning
the color-recoding, or because the films are in the public
domain.6
This commentary will first look at the background of color-
recoding, its process, and the people involved. It will then ana-
lyze several legal theories, other than copyright infringement,7
which might be used by filmmakers8 to protect their films, with
particular attention paid to case law dealing with the editing of
motion pictures for television. The next section discusses some
of the differences between editing and color-recoding and the
effect these differences may have on the judicial review of ac-
tions brought by filmmakers. It is then argued that the addi-
tion of color alone can serve as a basis for legal action, apart
from any editorial alteration. Finally, the last section con-
cludes that courts presently have the power to protect these
films and their creators.
Harris, Copyright Office Hears The Case of Colorizers, Daily Variety, Oct. 17, 1986, at
1, col. 1, 26, col. 2.
6. In response, Congress, on May 12, 1987, held hearings on the issue of color-
recoding. Hearings on Colorization Before the Subcomm. on Technology and the Law
ctf the Senate Judiciary Comm., 100th Cong., 1st Seas. (1987).
7. For a summary of the copyright issues raised by color-recoding, see Green-
stone, A Coat of Paint on the Past?, 5 ENT. & SPORTS LAw. 1, 13-17 (Fall 1986); Cox,
Film Tinting Fight Raises Questions of Copyright Law, L.A. Daily J., Nov. 10, 1986, at
1, col. 6. To date, it appears that only one actual copyright infringement action has
been brought. See RKO Pictures, Inc. v. Color Sys. Technology, Inc., No. CV 86-6816
FFF (Gx), (C.D. Ca. filed Oct. 20, 1986). The complaint alleges that Ted Turner's
attempt to color-recode ten RKO pictures is an infringement of RKO's copyright be-
cause, while Ted Turner has distribution rights to these pictures, he does not own the
copyrights. RKO Pictures Sues Over Colorization, L.A. Times, Oct. 22,1986, § VI (Cal-
endar), at 10, col. 3. This suit has been stayed pending the outcome of a previously-
filed New York case in which Ted Turner is suing RKO to obtain possession of the
fine-grain prints needed for the color-recoding process. RKO and Turner Put Coloriz-
ing on Hold, Daily Variety, Nov. 26, 1986, at 25, col. 1.
8. In general, this note will address the rights of directors and, in some instances,
cinematographers as well. While recognizing that filmmaking is a collaborative en-
deavor combining the talents of a wide variety of artists, the ultimate responsibility
for.a film's final look lies most predominantly with the director. This view of film-
making (wherein the director is considered the master of the film) is commonly called
the auteur theory and was first espoused by a group of French critics responsible for
Cahiers du Cinema, a French periodical. See J. ELLIs, A HISTORY OF FILM 300-03 (2d
ed. 1985). While not as popular as it was in the 1950s and 1960s, the theory has influ-
enced the art of motion picture directing and thus provides a convenient and useful




Color-recoding involves the selection and addition of color to
prints of black-and-white films. While there are various tech-
niques for coloring films, the processes are basically the same.
The film is transferred to videotape and colors are assigned to
the varying shades of gray. These selected colors are then
programmed into a computer which continues the coloring pro-
cess for each and every frame in the picture.9 The United
States Copyright Office has defined color-recoding as a system
which
involve[s] the use by "colorists" and art directors of computer
bases storing information gleaned by researchers relating to
the actual color of costumes, sets, locales, and performers in
black-and-white films. They apparently involve the applica-
tion of colors to shots in films by individuals interacting with
computers and special software. "Perfection" of the results
may involve use of animation techniques. Once the colorists
make certain initial decisions, the actual process of imposing
color onto the entire film appears to be largely computer
directed.10
Currently, there are two major companies engaged in the
business of adding color to films: Color Systems Technology,
Inc. and Colorization, Inc." Color Systems Technology's main
customer is media entrepreneur Ted Turner, who recently
purchased the film libraries of MGM, RKO, and Warner Broth-
ers.13 Colorization, Inc. colors films owned by Hal Roach Stu-
dios (Colorization's parent company) and films in the public
9. Raiders of the Lost Art, TIDE, Oct. 20, 1986, at 98; Mathews, Film Directors See
Red Over Ted T7rner Movie Tinting, L.A. Times, Sept. 12,1986, § VI (Calendar), at
1, cols. 1, 3. See also Relfsnyder, The Color Purple... And Blue and Red and Green,
VmEO REV. 48 (Aug. 1986).
10. Notice of Inquiry, 51 Fed. Reg. 32,665, 32,666 (1986). Additionally, there ap-
pears to be a non-computer assisted method of color-recoding called Chromalod. I&
The Copyright Office is looking into the copyrightability of the color-recoded versions
of motion pictures. "Although [the Copyright Office] follows with interest the public
and industry debate as to whether colorization risks mutilating the conscious artistry
of black-and-white cinematographers, these issues can not and do not form any part of
this present inquiry." IdE
11. Md; Mathews, Film Directors See Red, supra note 9, at 1, col. 3.
12. Mathews, Film Directors See Red, supra note 9, at 1, col. 1, 11, col. 1.
13. li at 1, col 1. See also Ted 7rner Defends Coloring Classics, S.F. Chron.,
Oct. 24, 1986, § 3 (Daily Punch), at 83, col. 4 (" 'All I'm trying to do is protect my
investment in MGM,' said Turner, who earlier this year paid more than $1.2 billion for
the studio's S650-title library of movies").
1987]
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The proponents of color-recoding 5 cite audience preference
as the main reason behind the move. They argue that televi-
sion stations avoid showing black-and-white movies and con-
sumers refrain from buying black-and-white video cassettes."6
For example, a 1985 television broadcast of a color-recoded ver-
sion of Miracle on 34th Street'7 had higher ratings than earlier
black-and-white showings,8 and a telephone poll on Turner's
Cable News Network showed that sixty-one percent of the re-
spondents preferred watching color-recoded versions of black-
and-white classics.' 9 According to Charles Powell, executive
vice president of Color Systems Technology, "the contracts are
pouring in.''20 Because of this, classics are arguably reborn and
attract audiences which may otherwise never see the origi-
nals.2 ' Proponents of color-recoding also argue that the integ-
rity of the film is preserved through research into the actual
colors of the costumes, sets, and locales.' 2 Finally, proponents
hold that increased sales provide income in the;form of residu-
14. Mathews, Film Directors See Red, supra note 9, at 11, col. 1.
One author has argued that the creators of public domain films have additional
publicity and privacy rights not discussed in this commentary which are violated by
color-recoding. See Greenstone, supra note 7, at 17-18.
15. In addition to those involved in the process, the Motion Picture Association of
America, a trade association which represents the major film studios, also supports
color-recoding. Mathews, Color Coordinates, L.A. Times, Oct. 22, 1986, § VI (Calen-
dar), at 10, col. 2.
16. Mathews, Film Directors See Red, supra note 9, at 10, col. 1.
17. 20th-Century Fox Film Corp. 1947.
18. Katz & Curry, Film Fight Has Some Seeing Red, USA Today, Oct. 21,1986, at
ID, col. 1, 2D, col. 3.
19. Raiders of the Lost Art, supra note 9.
20. Mathews, Film Directors See Red, supra note 9, at 10, col. 2; Mathews, The
War Over Colorized Films, S.F. Chron., Oct. 3, 1986, at 82, cols. 3, 4.
21. Mathews, Film Directors See Red, supra note 9, at 10, col. 1; Raiders of the
Lost Art, upra note 9; Ted Turner Defends Coloring Classics, supra note 13, at cola 5,
6.
22. See Raiders f the Lost Art, supra note 9; Mathews, Film Directors See Red,
supra note 9, at 10, col. 2; Notice of Inquiry, supra note 10, at 32,666. However, in
briefs filed with the Copyright Office, color-recoding companies statedk
The colors used are selected by individuals according to their interpreta-
tion of the work, as well as their creative judgment, as to what colors are
most effective, compelling and appropriate to the film.... Selections are
made to produce or enhance aesthetic and dramatic values, to direct atten-
tion, to illuminate, to simulate or portray, and to otherwise convey meaning,
appearance, and information.
Harris, aupra note 5 (quoting comments of Hal Roach Studios and Color Systems
Technology).
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als to those who worked on the original films.2s
Opponents of color recoding2 are quick to respond to these
claims. Critics note that while video cassette rentals of color-
recoded films were initially good, the demand has slowed con-
siderably.25 Additionally, despite arguments that investigators
document the colors used on the original film set, such research
is often disregarded when the buyer wants something else,me or
if the color-recoders simply refuse to match exact colors.Y Fur-
thermore, since the computer palette is limited, richness of de-
tail is often lost.28 Not even the color-recoders themselves dare
to argue that color-recoded films are necessarily aesthetically
better than the originals,2 and critics routinely pan the quality
of the process.'
23. See Mathews, Film Directors See Red, supra note 9, at 1, col. 3; Robb, DGA
Board Officially Opposes Colori on of Vintage Films, Daily Variety, Oct. 20,1986,
at 1, col. 1, 10, col. 4 ("After exhausting all legal remedies, [Frank] Capra [director of
It's a Wonderful Life (RKO Pictures, Inc. 1935)] said that he very reluctantly signed a
contract that gave him a share of profits from the colorized version of the film").
24. Among the unions, guilds, and associations opposed to color-recoding are the
Directors Guild of America, Inc. (DGA), the Writers Guild of America West, Inc.
(WGA West), the American Film Institute (AFI) and the American Society of Cine-
matographers (ASC). Letter from the President's Committee of the Directors Guild
to Gilbert Cates, DGA President (Sept. 4, 1986) [hereinafter DGA Letter]; Robb,
supra note 23, at 1, col. 1; Letter from Brian Walton, WGA Executive Director, to
Jean Firstenberg, Director, AFI (Sept. 30, 1986) [hereinafter WGA Letter]; Position
Statement of the Board of Trustees of the American Film Institute (Oct. 1, 1986)
[hereinafter AFI Position Statement]; Robb, ASCJoins the Opposition to B&W Color.
ing, Daily Variety, Oct. 8, 1986, at 1, col. 1. This list is by no means all-inclusive. It
seems that every day new opponents to color-recoding emerge.
Additionally, numerous individuals, including Woody Allen, Billy Wilder, Steven
Spielberg, and Jimmy Stewart have spoken out against the practice. Mathews, Film
Directors See Red, supra note 9, at 1, cols. 2-3; Raiders of the Lost Art, supra note 9,
AFI Opposes Computer Coloring of Black-and-White Films, Press Release (Oct. 1,
1986).
At least one studio has publicly stated that it has "decided to shun" color-recoding
of its black-and-white films. Goldwyn to Avoid Colorizing Movies, Hollywood Re-
porter, Oct. 2, 1986, at 4, col. 1.
25. Katz & Curry, supra note 18, at D2, col. 1.
26. "Wilson Markle, head of Colorization Inc., tells the story of a client who re-
Jected a Western that his company had colored using authentic desert brown for the
backdrop. Markle's colorizers changed the brown to green and sent it back and all
was well." Mathews, Film Directors See Red, supra note 9, at 11, col. 2.
27. In the color-recoded version of Suddenly (United Artists, Corp. 1954) starring
Frank Sinatra, "01' Blue Eyes" has brown eyes. Siskel & Ebert & The Moview
Colorization (Buena Vista Television, Inc. 1986). See also supra note 21.
28. DGA Comments, upra note 5, at 7.
29. Mathews, Color Coordinates, supra note 15, at coL &
30. See, e, Raiders f the Lost Art, supra note 9, Clark, flnting Itk a terible
idea, USA Today, Oct. 21, 1986, at 2D, col. 2; Siskel & Ebert & The Movie- Coloriza-
COMM/ENT L. J.
The thrust of the opponents' argument stems from the belief
that "if films were made in black-and-white (for whatever rea-
son), their creators designed them to take advantage of the
unique opportunities and possibilities as well as the limitations
offered by black-and-white photography."' As the director of
the American Film Institute stated, "When you make a film in
black and white, you light it for the black and white cam-
era .... There are different shadings, subtleties and elements,
and you can't change them mechanically." Color-recoding
"changes the mood, subverts the original concepts, alters subtle
lighting and shadowing techniques, redirects the viewer's focus
away from where the director intended it to be and presumes to
add authenticity where a distorted reality may well have been
the director's intention.""
This argument is most persuasive when one realizes that
many recent critically acclaimed films such as Manhattan,"
The Elephant Man,5 and Kiss of the SpiderwomanM have been
photographed in whole or part in black-and-white because of
the emotional and/or psychological impact that attends black-
and-white film. Opponents of color-recoding argue that the art-
ist has the right to present his work as he sees fit, regardless of
audience preference. Finally, some critics suggest that the pro-
cess "represents a mutilation of history, the vandalism of our
common past, not merely as it relates to film, but as it affects
society's perception of itself.""
To date, no cases have held that color-recoding is an injury to
the filmmaker which can be remedied by the courts. No film-
maker has legally challenged the color-recoding companies'
right to add color to black-and-white films, whether copy-
righted or in the public domain. However, there are several
legal theories under which a filmmaker might bring suit
against color-recoders who alter his work.'8 The causes of ac-
tion (Buena Vista Television, Inc. 1986). But see Carman, What a Blessing is
'Colorization,' S.F. Chron., Nov. 11, 1986, Part III, at 54, col. 1.
31. DGA Letter, supra note 24.
32. Katz & Curry, supra note 18, at D2, col. 1.
33. Mathews, Film Directors See Red, supra note 9, at 10, col. 1.
34. United Artists Corp. 1979.
35. Paramount Pictures Corp. 1980.
38. Island Alive 1985.
37. DGA Letter, supra note 24.
38. Additionally, Congressman Richard Gephardt (D-Mo.) has introduced a bill in
the House which, if passed, would give directors control over material alterations of
their films, including color-recoding. See Film Integrity Act of 1987, H.R. 2400, 100th
[Vol. 9:523
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tion discussed below indicate that while filmmakers may not be
able to recover for the actual alteration of their films, they may




A. State Moral Rights Legislation
In Europe it has long been held that artists retain certain
rights in the works they create beyond those economic and
property rights recognized under copyright law.39 These inter-
ests, known as droit morale or moral rights, allow an artist to
prevent any destruction, mutilation, or other distortion which
"would prejudice his honor or reputation."4 Enforcement of
these rights are governed by each country's own legislation."1
Furthermore, it appears that moral rights may not be waived
by contract.42
In the United States, similar protections have only recently
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). Congressman Gephardt's introduction of the bill is at 133
Cong. Rec. E. 1922 (Daily ed. May 13, 1987).
39. Merryman, The Rrtigeraor of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1023, 1025
(1976). On moral rights in general, see also Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A
Study in the Law of Artists, Authors and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REv. 554 (1940);
Treece, American Law Analogues of the Author's "Moral Right," 16 AM. J. COMP. L
487 (1968); Comment, Toward Artists Integrity: Implementing Moral Right Through
Extension of Existing American Legal Doctrines, 60 GEO. LJ. 1539 (1972) (hereinafter
Comment, Towards Artistic Integrity]; Comment, Copyright" Moral Right-A Propo-
sal, 43 FoRDHAM . REv. 793 (1975)[hereinafter Comment, A Proposal]; Rosen, Art-
ists' Moral Rights- A European Evolution, An American Revolution, 2 CARD=
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 155 (Winter 1983).
40. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886 (Paris Revision 1971) art. 6k" (1). Canada subscribes to an earlier version of the
Berne Convention (Rome 1928) which contains an almost identical article 6&. Letter
from Kathy Milson, Information Assistant, Canadian Consulate General, to Sho-
sharer [Suzmnne (Shoshana)] Schiller (Nov. 11, 1986). See also Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,1886 (Rome Revision 1928) art.
6bis (1); Multilateral Agreements in the Fields qf Industrial and Intellectual Property
to which Canada is a Party 2-3 (Jan. 1986) (available from the Canadian Consulate
General, San Francisco, California). This may be significant since Color Systems
Technology is based in Canada, Mathews, Film Directors See Red, supra note 9 at 1,
col 3, and therefore may be liable under this international treaty.
41. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistle Works, Sept. 9,
.1886 (Paris Revision 1971) art. 6& (3).
42. M. NnmnR, 2 NamWER AN CoPYRIGHT I 8"21[a], at 8-247 (1985); Nimmer, Im-
plications f the Prospective Rievisione f the Berne Cbnvention and the United Shtae
Copyright Law, 19 STAN. I. REV. 499, 523 (1967).
1987]
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been recognized. California,4 New York,"4 and Massachusetts4 5
have led the way in enacting statutes which protect artists'
moral rights. Unfortunately, neither the California nor the
New York statute includes films within the scope of its protec-
tion. While the California law prohibits "the physical deface-
ment, mutilation, alteration, or destruction of a work of fine
art,"4 subject matter is limited by the statute's definition of
"work of fine art" as "an original painting, sculpture, or draw-
ing, or an original work of art in glass, of recognized quality
.... ,,47 Thus, by omission, cinematography-indeed photogra-
phy of any kind-is denied protection.
The New York statute is even more definite in its exclusion
of film. It prohibits any person (except the artist or a person
acting with the artist's consent) from
knowingly display[ing] in a place accessible to the public or
publish[ing] a work of fine art... or a reproduction thereof in
an altered, defaced, mutilated, or modified form if the work is
displayed, published or reproduced as ibeing the work of the
artist, or under circumstances under which it would reasonably
be regarded as being the work of the artist, and damage to the
artist's reputation is reasonably likely to result therefrom, ex-
cept that this section shall not apply to sequential imagery such
as that in motion pictures."
Only the Massachusetts legislation affords protection against
the mutilation of films. In that statute, the prohibition against
alteration is similar to the one found in California law, but the
statutory subject matter covers "any original work of visual or
graphic art of any media which shall include, but not be limited
to, any painting, print, drawing, sculpture, craft object, photo-
graph, audio or visual tape, film, hologram, or any combination
thereof, of recognized quality."49 Problems arise when dealing
with color-recoding, however, because the statute, unlike the
New York legislation, prohibits the modification but not the
display of altered works. Since there are no color-recoding
43. CAL. Crv. CODE § 987 (West Supp. 1987).
44. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAw § 14.03 (McKinney Supp. 1987).
45. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 231, § 85S (West Supp. 1986).
46. CAL. Civ. CODE § 987(c) (West Supp. 1987).
47. Id. § 987(b)(2).
48. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAw § 14.03(1) (McKinney Supp. 1987) (emphasis
added).
49. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 231, § 85S (West Supp. 1986) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 9:523
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companies located in Massachusetts, this law too appears to be
ineffective in combatting color-recoding.
B. Personal Torts
There are two personal torts which may arise from the color-
recoding of a black-and-white motion picture.'e The first of
these is defamation; the second is false light invasion of privacy.
1. Defamation
In bringing a defamation action, the filmmaker must prove
that the defendant, negligently or otherwise,5' made a false"
and defamatory- communication that caused injury to the
plaintiff's reputation."
Statements of attribution have been considered communica-
tions for purposes of a defamation action.M Furthermore, la-
50. As mentioned earlier, at least one other author has suggested that additional
publicity and privacy rights may attach when the film being altered is in the public
domain See supra note 9.
51. Since most, if not all, color-recoding defendants show these altered films on
television, it is likely that they will be considered media defendants by the courts.
Additionally, many plaintiff directors might be considered public figures. Thus, plain-
tiffs will probably be required to prove "actual malice" under New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (holding that the first amendment's protection of
the press required certain plaintiffs to prove that the media defendant had acted with
knowledge that the defamatory statement was false, or with a reckless disregard as to
whether or not it was false). However, following the recent cases of Dun & Brad-
street, Inc. v. Greenmoss, 472 U.S. 749 (1986), and Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v.
Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986), it is arguable that a further or alternative distinction can
be made between public and non-public issues. If so, it is probably safe to say that
color-recoding is not a matter of public concern in the traditional sense. Since the
status of defamation law is currently unclear on this point, it is difficult to say how
this would affect the liability standard.
52. Strictly speaking, truth is a defense to a defamation action. Thus, the burden
of proof is on the defendant. I ELDRIDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION 323-24 (1978). A
recent Supreme Court decision has held that where there is a media defendant and
the matter is one of public concern, the plaintiff must prove falsity. Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558, 1599, 1564 (1986). It is doubtful, however,
that color-recoding would be considered a matter of public concern and thus this case
would not apply.
53. A defamatory communication is one which "tends so to harm the reputation
of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third per-
sons from associating or dealing with him." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559
(1976).
54. Idc at §558.
55. See, e.g., Geisel v. Poynter Prod. Inc., 295 F.Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (approv-
ing of the general principle but rejecting the cause of action in the particular case);
Carroll v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 3 F.D. 95 (SD.N.Y 1942); Edison v. Viva Intl,
Ltd., 70 A.D.2d 379, 421 N.YS.2d 203 (1979) (approving of the general principle cause
COMM/ENT L. J.
beling an altered film as that of the director has been held to
meet the falsity requirements. An early case was Carroll v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc.5M The plaintiff, a well-known pro-
ducer of movies and plays, was credited with producing a film
which was in reality merely photographed at the plaintiff's din-
ner theater. The film was of poor quality and "vastly inferior
to the plays and motion pictures with which the plaintiff had
been associated as producer in the past .... ."57 In denying a
motion to dismiss the action for failure to state a cause of ac-
tion, the court held that "[tihe asserted false imputation to
plaintiff... of the production of an inferior work that injures
his position as a producer... is libelous per se. ''s In Clevenger
v. Baker Voorhies & Co.T the court dealt with an action by the
author of a law book. The book was updated by someone other
than the original author, and many of the revisions were incor-
rect ° The court concluded that the plaintiff could maintain an
action for libel since the implication that he was the author of
the new material was.indeed false.
6 '
Similarly, color-recoding involves the addition of new mate-
rial--color. A "directed by... " credit implies responsibility
for the entire film and thus would imply that the director is
responsible for the choice of color. Distributors may argue that
disclaimers will solve this problem. However, one appellate
court has held that disclaimers are inadequate in
eras[ing] the indelible impression that is made by a television
broadcast, especially since the viewer has no means of compar-
ing the [distorted] version with the [original] work in order to
determine for himself the talents of the plaintiff. Further-
more, a disclaimer ... would go unnoticed by viewers who
tuned in to the broadcast a few minutes after it began. 2
The most difficult hurdle a filmmaker must overcome under
a defamation theory is to convince the trier of fact that the
statement is in fact defamatory. Those who would probably be
the most offended by a color-recoded version-namely film
of action in the particular case); Clevenger v. Baker Voorhies and Co., 203 N.Y.S.2d
812, 168 N.E.2d 643 (1960).
56. 3 F.RD. 95 (1942).
57. I& at 96.
58. d,
59. 203 N.Y.S.2d 812, 168 N.E.2d 643 (1960).
60. Id at 813-14, 168 N.E.2d at 644.
61. Icd at 816, 168 N.E.2d at 645-46.
62. Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 25 n.13 (2d Cir. 1976) (dis-
cussing the ineffectiveness of a disclaimer on an edited television program).
[Vol. 9:523
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buffs and industry members-are likely to know whether or
not a particular film was originally shot in black-and-white;
they are more apt to ridicule the color-recoder rather than the
director. The general viewing audience may actually have a
better impression of the filmmaker, for they may never have
seen any of his original work. Whether the plaintiff was de-
famed will be decided by the trier of fact. The relevant factors
which the court should take into account may include the im-
portance of black-and-white to the original film and the quality
of the color-recoding. Regardless, it seems highly unlikely that
any court would find that the damage done to a filmmaker by
color-recoding will meet the high burden set for defamation
actions.
2. False Light Invasion of Privacy
The tort of false light invasion of privacy, while similar to
defamation, is a distinct cause of action. Dean Prosser recog-
nized four different actions involving the right of privacy,6 de-
fining the false light version as "publicity that places the
plaintiff in a false light in the public eye."'" Some argue that
false light protects the same interest as defamation-reputa-
tion-and has the same "overtones of mental distress."' While
a cause of action for defamation requires the publication to be
"objectionable to the reasonable man," false light does not."
Thus, some of the difficulties a plaintiff encounters with defa-
mation may not be present in alleging false light.67 In short, it
will be much easier for a director to prove that the color-recod-
ing of a film is offensive but not necessarily injurious.
In Stevens v. National Broadcasting Company,68 the court
held that a false light cause of action by director George Ste-
vens existed where his movie A Place in the Sun9 was edited
for television.70 The court stated that a cause of action would
63. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383, 389 (1960).
64. Id at 398.
65. I& at 400. But see W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 864 (th
ed. 1984) (invasion of privacy "protect[s] a person's interest in being let alone. .
66. Prosser, supra note 63, at 400.
67. Note, however, that the actual malice standard may also be applied in false
light cases. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E & caveat (1981); Cox Broad-
casting Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 490-91 (1975); Cantrell v. Forrest City Publishing
Co., 419 US. 245, 250-51 (1974); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967).
68. 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 755 (Cal. Super. Ct., I-A. Co. 1966).
69. Paramount Pictures Corp. 1951.
70. 148 US.P.Q. (BNA) at 756.
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lie where the distributor has "emasculat[ed] a motion picture so
that the picture will no longer contain substantially the same
motion and dynamic and dramatic qualities."'" The court
showed concern for protecting "the mood [and the] effect"72 of
the film. While it may prove difficult to establish that color-
recoding causes substantial injury to a filmmaker's reputation,
it is much easier to demonstrate that color-recoding has de-
stroyed the mood or effect that the filmmaker intended, and
thus portrays the filmmaker in a "false light."
C. Lanham Act/Unfair Competition
Another option available to the filmmaker seeking to pre-
vent color-recoding is to bring an action under section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act,7" which in some respects codifies the common
law action of unfair competition. One of the benefits of a Lan-
ham Act cause of action is that, unlike the state statutory and
common law claims discussed in this commentary, a section
43(a) claim cannot be preempted by the copyright laws.74 That
section of the trademark law provides that
[a]ny person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connec-
tion with any goods or services... a false designation of origin,
or any false description or representation, including words or
other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the
same, and shall cause such goods or services to enter into com-
mere ... shall be liable to a civil action by any person.., who
believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any
such false description or representation.75
The scope of this section of the Lanham Act has been broadly
construed by courts to provide relief in a diverse number of sit-
uations.7" In Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies,"
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that section 43(a)
could provide an artist with a type of protection similar to that
offered by European moral rights laws.7" The plaintiffs in Gil-
liam, the British comedy group Monty Python, sued ABC when
71. I& at 755.
72. Id at 758.
73. Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act) § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982).
74. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 301(a),(d) (1982).
75. Trademark Act of 1976 (Lanham Act) § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982).
76. Comment, The Monty Python Litigation-Of Moral Right and the Lanham
Act, 125 U. PA. L REV. 611, 621 (1977).
77. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
78. d, at 23-24.
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the network excessively edited and then broadcast several of
Monty Python's half-hour programs." In directing the issu-
ance of a preliminary injunction, the court held, inter alia, that
ABC was liable under the Lanham Act for broadcasting the ed-
ited programs as the work of Monty Python.*° The court found
that the damage to the programs caused by the editing was se-
vere enough to cause the on-screen crediting of Monty Python
as author to be a misrepresentation as to origin. Thus, "a viola-
tion [of the Lanham Act] had occurred because the program,
although correctly identified as being written and performed
by Monty Python, was substantially different from the group's
original intended creation."81 The opinion implied that Monty
Python would "suffer the consequences of the mutilation, for
the public will have only the final [edited] product by which to
evaluate the work;" therefore, the presentation to the public of
the altered version "should be recognized as stating a cause of
action under [section 43(a)]."
The Gilliam case has been analyzed by several commenta-
tors.m It appears that film alteration gives rise to section 43(a)
liability when three criteria are met: (1) the film or program is
substantially distorted; (2) because of the distortion, crediting
the original filmmaker is a misrepresentation of origin; and (3)
the filmmaker/artist's name carries a secondary meaning.
First, the court must determine whether the color-recoding
of a film is a substantial distortion. This may depend on several
factors, including the quality of the original work, the impor-
tance of light and dark in the original work, and possibly the
quality of the color-recoding itself." It may be argued that
there is little or no artistic difference between the reediting of a
television program and the color-recoding of a movie. While it
might be said that one process removes matter from a film
while the other adds to it, color-recoding cannot be distin-
guished on that basis. Actor Jimmy Stewart, after seeing part
79. Id. at 17-18.
80. Id at 23.
81. Comment, Monty Python and the Lanham Act In Search of the Moral Righ4
30 RuTGERs L. REV. 452, 470-71 (1977).
82. 538 F.2d at 24-25.
83. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 76; Comment, upra note 81; Comment, Protec-
tion of Artistic Integrity: Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, 90 HARv. L.
REV. 473 (1976).
84. For a more thorough discussion of color-recoding as a distortion justifying
legal redress, see inifra text accompanying notes 117-28.
1987]
COMM/ENT L. J.
of It's a Wonderful Life 5 in color, noted that the subtle shad-
ings had been completely "wiped out.''se
Since the gravamen of a I.anham Act complaint is that misla-
beling of the film misleads the public as to the origin of its
contents, the court must next determine whether attributing a
color-recoded film to a director and/or cinematographer is an
act of misrepresentation.87 There is probably no misrepresen-
tation in connection with members of the cast and crew receiv-
ing on-screen credit. However, any time a director or
cinematographer's name appears on a color-recoded film, there
is a potential misrepresentation. The distinction lies in the fact
that the director or cinematographer is responsible for control-
ling the way a film will look on the screen. From the outset,
the actor does not have this capability and therefore cannot
claim a violation of rights that he never had. The nature of an
actor's performance is no different whether the film is made in
black-and-white or color; the actor never had such a choice.
Thus, billing him as the star of a color-recoded movie would not
be a misrepresentation.M
Finally, it must be determined whether a particular film-
maker's name carries secondary meaning. Secondary meaning
is defined as public association of a product with its maker.M
Determining when secondary meaning exists is, of course, de-
pendent on the definition of public-whether the context is the
general filmgoing audience or the smaller filmmaking commu-
nity. Few directors, and even fewer cinematographers, are
well-known to the general public or associated with particular
types or styles of films. Thus, under this analysis, the recogniz-
able styles of films by Orson Welles, Alfred Hitchcock, and
Frank Capra may receive protection, while equally deserving
works by lesser-known directors would receive no protection.'
It is equally important, however, that members of the film
85. RKO Pictures, Inc. 1947.
86. Mathews, The War Over Colorized Films, supra note 20, col. 5.
87. As discussed supra note 62 and accompanying text, the Gilliam court held
that the addition of a disclaimer would not counteract the impression made by the
program as a whole.
88. But ee Autry v. Republic Prods., 213 F.2d 667 (1954) (actor Gene Autry
brought suit to enjoin the television broadcasting of edited versions of his films).
89. J. McCARTHY, 1 TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 15.2 at 658-60 (2d
ed. 1984).




industry not be misled. Therefore, a much better analysis
would be to determine secondary meaning in the context of the
film industry. A filmmaker's reputation stems not only from
the general public's perception of his work, but also from that
of the critics and studio executives. Damage to a filmmaker's
reputation may mean fewer opportunities to direct, inability to
attract the best talent, or difficulty in obtaining financing for
future projects."' Therefore, if the film community setting is
used to assess secondary meaning, the test becomes much more
realistic.
While this approach suggests merely one method of analyz-
ing a possible Lanham Act cause of action, it conveys the essen-
tial idea that a suit brought under section 43(a) might not be
limited to facts identical to those in the Gilliam case; rather,
the Act can apply to a variety of situations, including those
where classic films have been altered through color-recoding.9
C. Breach of Contract
Finally, color-recoders may be liable under a breach of con-
tract theory.93 Several cases have held that a contract provision
requiring an artist to receive billing for his work carries with it
an implied covenant that the other party will not alter the
work to such a degree that the billing becomes false. Thus, a
director may argue that his contract with a studio or distributor
has been breached when a film has been color-recoded and the
alteration is significant. This seems plausible when one consid-
91. The issue of monetary harm and special damages may not even be essential to
a section 43(a) claim. In the recent case of Follett v. New American Library, Inc., 497
F.Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), the court found a violation of section 43(a) without even
discussing the issue of monetary harm to the plaintiff. Furthermore, even if it is cur-
rently recognized that the color-recoding does not reflect on the quality of the direc-
tor's film, time may have a way of blurring the distinction between the work done by
the director and that created by the color-recoders.
92. It is possible to argue, however, that there is at least one other requirement
for a Lanham Act claim to succeed: a contractual reservation of at least some final
artistic or creative rights. While the portion of the Gilliam opinion dealing with the
Lanham Act claim does not discuss the Monty Python contracts, Monty Python did
reserve certain rights in both the programs and the scripts, and the court was acutely
aware of this important fact. Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 19,
21 (2d Cir. 1976). For a discussion of possible breach of contract claims, see infr text
accompanying notes 93-111.
93. This cause of action would be unavailable in the case of a public domain film
being color-recoded since there would be no privity of contract between the film-
maker and the distributor.
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ers that color-recoders make decisions which alter and in some
cases supersede decisions originally made by the director.
One of the first significant cases dealing with this type of
breach was Granz v. Harris." The plaintiff, a record producer,
sold several master recordings to the defendant. Records made
from the recordings were to bear the credit "Presented by Nor-
man Granz." The actual records made and sold by the defend-
ant deleted several minutes of the original works.M The court
made a factual determination that the editing was enough to
make the billing a false representation e and held that the con-
tractual provision requiring the billing implied that the defend-
ant could not "sell records which would make the required
legend a false representation."' ' "Whether the work is copy-
righted or not, the established rule is that, even if the contract
with the artist expressly authorizes reasonable modifications
•.. ,it is an actionable wrong to hold out the artist as author of
a version which substantially departs from the original."''
The concurring opinion by Judge Gurfein in Gilliam also in-
dicated that a breach of contract action would lie in such in-
stances 99 He argued that ABC's "deletion of portions . . .
constitute[d] a breach of contract"''1 because "[a]n obligation to
mention the name of the author carries the implied duty.., as
a matter of contract, not to make such changes in the work as
would render the credit line a false attribution of author-
ship.''11 This reasoning is identical to that used by the majority
in analyzing the editing as a violation of the Lanham Act; here,
Judge Gurfein merely extends the reasoning to contract law.102
Some question remains as to whether the artist must explic-
itly reserve final editorial rights in his contract to recover, espe-
cially since Monty Python had reserved such rights in its
contract with the BBC."oa In discussing Monty Python's copy-
94. 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952).
95. 1& at 586-87.
96. Id at 587-88.
97. Id at 588.
98. Id at 589 (Frank, J., concurring).




102. As there was no privity of contract between ABC and Monty Python, it has
been suggested that this part of Judge Gurfein's opinion may be mere dicta. See 1 T.
SELz & M. SIMENsKY, ENTERTAINMiENT LAw § 16.13 at 16-19 n.6 (1983).
103. 538 F.2d at 21.
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right claims, the Gilliam majority relied heavily on the fact
that the group evidenced an intent in their licensing agreement
to retain a "superior interest" in the work.' In Preminger v.
Columbia Pictures Corp.,1" the court did require that a plain-
tiff director contractually reserve the right to a final edit, hold-
ing that the television editing of Anatomy of a Murder1" fell
within the usual trade custom and practice.107 But while the
court rejected Otto Preminger's argument that the editing con-
stituted a breach of contract in that it "falsely represent[ed] to
the public that the film shown [was] Preminger's,"108 the court
went on to say that Preminger could sue again if future editing
amounted to a "mutilation. '' 1°9 Similarly, in Edison v. Viva In-
ternationa Ltd, 11° the court noted that a contract provision
granting the right to alter a work may "merely permit reason-
able modification of the original article but does not allow sub-
stantial departure therefrom."1 1
III
Editing Versus Color-Recoding
Since most relevant available case law involves film editing,
it is important to discuss at least two differences between film
editing and color-recoding, differences which weigh in favor of
color-recoding opponents.112 First, the editing process has ex-
isted almost since the advent of film. Arguably, filmmakers
could reasonably have contemplated or foreseen the editing of
their films and expressly reserved rights in their studio con-
tracts. However, while a director may have contractually
granted to a distributor the right to perform a final edit, he
probably could not have foreseen color-recoding1 3 and there-
104. 1& at 19.
105. 49 Misc. 2d 363, 267 N.Y.S.2d 594 (1966).
106. Columbia Pictures Corp. 1951.
107. 49 Misc. 2d at 371, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 603.
108. Id at 364, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 596.
109. IdE at 372, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 603.
110. 70 A.D.2d 379, 421 N.Y.S.2d 203 (1979).
111 Id. at 383, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 205-06.
112. A third distinction is that editing subtracts material while color-recoding adds
it. See supra text accompanying note 86.
113. One could argue that the technology was foreseeable, especially in light of the
fact that there had been several less practical attempts to color film. See supra notes
1-2 and accompanying text. However, it certainly was not a standard practice to add
color to black-and-white films, and when color was added, it was usually at the
request of the director and for effect. For an example, see The Birth of a Nation
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fore could not have explicitly granted the right to color.114
Second, as the above cases themselves indicate, editing can be
done to different extents. Consequently, as the Preminger case
indicated, a line can be drawn between permissible editing and
that which amounts to a mutilation.115 In the editing process, it
is possible for only one scene to be altered; in fact, in editing for
television, the object, one hopes, is to edit as little as possible.
Color-recoding is quite different. In the color-recoding pro-
cess, the object is to add color to as much of the film as possible.
While both editing and color-recoding can be either poorly or
well done, editing can be a matter of degree. A black-and-white
film is either color-recoded throughout or not. Therefore, the
color-recoding of a certain film is either an actionable mutila-
tion or not. Furthermore, since the process is so new, courts
have no custom or trade practice to rely on."16
IV
Color-Recoding is Distortion Justifying
Legal Redress
Having reviewed the precedents set by cases dealing with ed-
iting, and having distinguished editing from color-recoding, it
remains to be determined whether the addition of color to
(Epoch Producing Corp. 1915), in which D.W. Griffith used tinting for dramatic effect.
L. HALLIuELL, supra note 1, at 159.
114. Under present judicial thought, there is a general presumption made by the
courts that an artist, when giving up a copyright, also waives all creative control ex-
cept for that which he explicitly reserves for himself by contract. Comment, supru
note 81 at 473; Geisel v. Poynter Prod., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331, 344 (1968). However, it
has been argued that a studio or distribution contract should be construed so as to
reserve for the artist any rights not expressly granted to the studio or distributor. See
Comment, Protection of Artistic Integrity: Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Compa-
nies, 90 HARV. L. REV. 473 (1976); Comment, Towards Artistic Integrity, supra note
39, at 1559; Comment, A Proposal, supra note 39 at 818 n.219 (1975) (suggesting a revi-
sion of the federal copyright laws that would grant to an artist the "right to object to
distortion, mutilation or alteration" even after the transfer of the copyright). From
this perspective, a distributor or copyright holder will have received what he bar-
gained for despite not being able to color-recode a film which he owns. See, e.g., Ted
Turner Defends Coloring Classics, supra note 13, at col. 4 (" The last time I checked, I
owned the films that we're in the process of colorizing,' Turner said. 'I can do
whatever I want with them .... ' ").
115. Preminger v. Columbia Pictures, Inc., 49 Misc. 2d 363, 371, 267 N.Y.S.2d 594,
603 (1966).
116. In Preminger, the court indicated that the acceptability of editing for televi-
sion as a common trade practice was an important factor in deciding in favor of the
studio. MS at 599-604. Cf Stevens v. National Broadcasting Co., 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
755, 758 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. Co. 1966).
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black-and-white films can by itself serve as a basis for legal re-
covery. While there are almost no American cases which have
a bearing on this issue, an analysis of two French cases as well
as a brief look at film art lead to the conclusion that alteration
in the form of color-recoding can indeed support legal action.
In Millet, 117 for example, the son of Barbizon painter Jean
Francois Millet charged that two companies had violated his
deceased father's moral rights"' by publishing reproductions of
Millet's paintings in which they were altered and the intention-
ally drab colors were brightened. Millet's use of dull tones was
a function of his Realist style, and the court held that the illu-
mination and other changes were a mutilation warranting legal
intervention. The court specifically rejected two seemingly
forceful objections: (1) the notion that Millet's fame was so
well established that nothing could mar his reputation; and (2)
the fact that the original paintings were hanging in museums
and thus could be viewed in their intended state by those who
wished to see them in that form."' While the basis of recovery,
the European doctrine of moral rights, exists only in weak form
in the United States,'"c the fact that color has been recognized
as a significant part of an artists's work is important and can
influence the American courts.
In a multitude of cases, adding color to black-and-white films
would be a similar per se actionable alteration. Not all black-
and-white films were made because color was unavailable, and
many films used the medium in an intentional manner. "In
many cases, black-and-white was chosen and color specifically
rejected for artistic reasons."''" The distorted reality in Ger-
man Expressionist films like those of F.W. Murnau and Fritz
Lang is a direct result of harsh contrasts possible only with
black-and-white film stock.'l 2 "Likewise, 'Citizen Kane,' 'Casa-
blanca,' and countless other cinematic treasures will be fatally
117. Judgment of May 20, 1911, [1911] Artm. I 271 (Tribunal de la Seine). The
recitation of facts is derived from Merryman, The Rfrigrtor Qf Bernard Btffet, 27
HASTINGS L.J. 1023, 1029 (1976).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 39-42 (discussing artists' moral rights).
119. Merryman, supra note 117, at 1029 n.19. Variations of these two losing pro-
positions, particularly the latter, are often raised by proponents of color-recoding.
See, e.g., Carman, supra note 33, at col. 2.
120. See aupra text accompanying notes 39-49.
121. DGA Letter, 8upra note 24.
122. See also Raiders f the Lost Art, supra note 9 ("The expressionist riot of
shadows in, say, The Spiral Staircase (1945) is ominous and gorgeous and as vital to
the film as any actor or plot twist").
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diluted if subjected to the 'colorizing' annihilation."'I
Even when it cannot be shown that the black-and-white me-
dium is essential to an artist's work, there is precedent for the
view that the mere choice of colors by someone other than the
artist can form the basis for a lawsuit. In Bernhard-Rousseau v.
Soc. des Galer s Lafayette,"? the granddaughter of painter
Henri Rousseau sued a department store which used in window
displays reproductions of the artist's works with altered colors.
The court concluded that the choice of hues belonged to the
painter alone and could not be altered m
As the window dressers altered Rousseau's colors, so the
color-recoders make choices which rightfully belong to the di-
rector. "The choice of the appearance of any work of art does
not rest with the reader, the listener, the viewer or the audi-
ence. It rests with the artist. It is perhaps the most basic right
of an artist... ."'27 Even research into costumes and sets can-
not give one a window into the director's mind. When black-
and-white stock is being used, the director visualizes. the pic-
ture in terms of tone and contrast; the true color of a dress or
couch is immaterial as long as it produces the desired texture
on film.1  Adding colors, which involves making those creative
decisions, is no different from changing colors already decided.
While these two French cases are by no means precedent for
the American courts, they provide an invaluable resource on
which American courts can rely. These cases strongly suggest
that color-recoding can be the basis for legal action, whether as
a per se alteration of a director's style or because someone other
than the filmmaker is making creative decisions which should
be solely within the discretion of the artist.
Conclusion
Black-and-white films fall into two categories, both of which
123. DGA Letter, -aspra note 24.
124. Judgment of Mar. 13,1973, summarized in [1974] 48 J.C.P. 224 (Tribunal de la
grande instance, Paris 3e). Again, the facts have been taken from Merryman, supra
note 117, at 1030.
125. Merryman, supra note 117, at 1030.
126. See supra notes 21 & 26.
127. DGA Letter, supra note 24. "Determining the colors that people wear, or
what colors the walls are and so on are major creative decisions." Woody Allen as
quoted in Mathews, Film Directors See Red, supra note 9, at 1, ol. 2-3.
128. Telephone interview with Rufus Butler Seder, co-founder of the Boston Black
and White Movie Company (Nov. 24, 1986).
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can be protected under existing law. The first category in-
cludes films which are artistically destroyed or distorted by the
addition of color. The second encompasses films which argua-
bly are altered, but not artistically destroyed or distorted by
color-recoding. Under the legal theories outlined above (except
for state moral rights legislation), directors and cinematogra-
phers may prevail in actions against film distributors when
their films fall into the first category.
Where films, like the paintings of Millet, rely on their tonal
qualities to create and emphasize mood and meaning, they de-
serve protection. However, courts may be more reluctant to
uphold claims of filmmakers falling within the second group
because of the emphasis placed on misrepresentation. All of
the possible legal causes of action rely heavily on the fact that
there has been an injury to reputation. American courts have
yet to recognize that works of art should be preserved for their
own sake and for the sake of future generations of viewers.
This commentary contends a film should be viewed as origi-
nally created, as the artist intended, regardless of the opinion of
others as to its quality or value when in black-and-white. No
one but the artist should be allowed to make creative decisions
which fundamentally affect the final work and how the public
views it. Since color-recoding always presents a risk of distor-
tion which invades the artist's personal rights, the courts
should err on the side of protection. While an action for defa-
mation may not lie, causes of action under the Lanham Act and
the common law doctrines of false light invasion of privacy and
breach of contract may provide relief to the injured filmmaker.
In the final analysis, preserving black-and-white films in
their original form maintains a sense of history and artistic pu-
rity which benefits, above all, the public. Filmmakers have
been quick to use the press to draw public attention to the
problem in an effort to put pressure on those responsible for
the wave of color-recoding. As this commentary has demon-
strated, legal remedies are also available, and filmmakers
should be encouraged to protect their works through both the
courts and the press.
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